Inhaltszusammenfassung

In this paper I outline and defend a novel approach to conscious perception, which I label “radical sensorimotor enactivism”. The aims of the paper are two-fold: (1) to respond to a common objection to theories like radical sensorimotor enactivism— that they are empirically vacuous— and explain why, because radical sensorimotor enactivism uses (a non-representational version of) predictive processing to operationalize its sub-personal aspects, this objection cannot be levelled at the theory; ...In this paper I outline and defend a novel approach to conscious perception, which I label “radical sensorimotor enactivism”. The aims of the paper are two-fold: (1) to respond to a common objection to theories like radical sensorimotor enactivism— that they are empirically vacuous— and explain why, because radical sensorimotor enactivism uses (a non-representational version of) predictive processing to operationalize its sub-personal aspects, this objection cannot be levelled at the theory; and, (2) to argue that radical sensorimotor enactivism provides a better empirical account of conscious perception than predictive processing taken as a stand-alone theory. I conclude that radical sensorimotor enactivism provides one with a strong over-arching conceptual framework for the scientific study of conscious perception which clarifies the relation between existing strands of empirical work and provides practical guidance for future research. As such, it is worthy of further development, study, and application in empirical settings.» weiterlesen» einklappen

Autoren

Klassifikation

DDC Sachgruppe:
Philosophie